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Introduction
Evaluating public policy is a central task of economics. Welfare economics presents different criteria. Research on program evaluation develops and applies a variety of di¤erent econometric estimators. Traditional empirical methods focus on mean impacts. Yet modern welfare economics emphasizes the importance of accounting for the impact of public policy on distributions of outcomes (Sen, 1997 (Sen, , 2000 . A large body of empirical evidence indicates that people di¤er in their responses to the same policy and act on those differences, and that the representative agent paradigm is a poor approximation to reality because the marginal entrant into a social program is often di¤erent from the average participant. (Heckman, 2001a) . This evidence highlights the importance of going beyond the representative agent framework when evaluating public policies. This paper summarizes our recent research on evaluating the distributional consequences of public policy. 1 Our research advances the economic policy evaluation literature beyond estimating assorted mean impacts to estimate the distributions of outcomes generated by di¤erent policies and to determine how those policies shift persons across the distributions of potential outcomes produced by them. We distinguish the average participant in a program from the marginal entrant.
Our research advances the existing literature on evaluating the distributional consequences of alternative policies beyond the "Veil of Ignorance" assumption used in modern welfare economics (See Atkinson 1970 , Sen 1997 , 2000 . Approaches based on that assumption compare two social states by assuming that the position of any particular individual in one distribution should be treated as irrelevant. In this approach the overall distribution 1 Carneiro, Hansen and Heckman (2000, revised 2001 ).
1 of outcomes is all that matters. This is a consequence of the anonymity postulate that is fundamental to that literature. Anonymity is the property that only the distribution of outcomes matters and that reversing the positions of any two persons in the overall distribution does not a¤ect the evaluation placed on the policy (or state of a¤airs) that produces the distribution.
There are normative arguments that support this criterion. (See Harsanyi, 1955 , Vickery, 1960 , and Roemer, 1996 . As a positive description of actual social choice processes, the "Veil of Ignorance" seems implausible. Participants in the political process are likely to forecast their outcomes under alternative economic policies, and assess policies in this light. (Heckman, 2001b) . This paper extends current practice by developing and applying methods that forecast how people fare under di¤erent policies. We link the literature in modern welfare economics to the treatment e¤ect literature. This paper proceeds as follows. We brie ‡y present the evaluation problem for an economy with two sectors (e.g. schooled and unschooled) where agents select or are selected into "treatment" (one of the two sectors). We consider policies that a¤ect choices of treatment (e.g. schooling) but not potential outcomes (the outcomes they experience under di¤er-ent treatments). We compare outcomes across two policy regimes that a¤ect treatment choices. This task is much easier when individuals respond in the same way to treatment than when they di¤er in their response to treatment, and act on those di¤erences in making treatment choice decisions. In the latter case, the marginal entrant into schooling is not the same as the average participant in treatment and the representative agent paradigm breaks down. In an appendix, we show how to generate the counterfactual distributions of outcomes produced by alternative policies.
We apply our analysis to estimate the distributional consequences of two proposed policy reforms in American education. Even though the two policies barely a¤ect the overall distribution of outcomes, and so would be judged to be equivalent to the pre-policy origin state under the Veil of Ignorance criterion, they have substantial e¤ects on a small group of people concentrated in the middle to the high end of the pre-policy wage distribution.
Marginal entrants attracted into college get smaller gains than average college students suggesting diminishing returns to programs that encourage college enrollment. Marginal entrants into junior college are about the same as average entrants, suggesting constant returns for that schooling level. Since most of the people a¤ected by the policies come from the middle to the high end of the original wage distribution, there is little impact of these policies on the poor.
The Evaluation Problem for Means and Distributions
In order to place our work in the context of the current literature on social program evaluation, and to link it to the economics of education, it is helpful to consider a simple generalized Roy (1951) economy with two sectors. Let S = 1 denote college and S = 0 be high school. Persons (or their agents, such as their parents) can choose to be in either sector. There are two potential outcomes for each person (Y 0 ; Y 1 ), only one of which is observed, since it is assumed that only one option can be pursued at any time. For simplicity, we assume that the decision rule governing sectoral choices is
Here C is the cost of choosing S = 1. In the context of a schooling model, C is tuition or monetized psychic cost, while Y 1 ¡ Y 0 is the net gain from schooling expressed, say, in present value terms.
We decompose Y 1 and Y 0 in terms of their means ¹ 1 and ¹ 0 and mean zero idiosyncratic deviations (U 1 ; U 0 ) or residuals:
We condition on X variables, but for notational simplicity we keep this dependence implicit.
Decomposing C in a similar fashion, we may write:
so that
It is fruitful to distinguish two kinds of policies: (a) those that a¤ect potential out- de…ned as
where S A and S B are schooling choice indicators under policies A and B respectively, without inquiring more deeply into the sources of the di¤erences in the distributions of outcomes.
The modern treatment e¤ect literature focuses on these details and distinguishes choice of treatments from the treatment outcomes. However, it only inquires about certain mean treatment e¤ects. The operating assumption in the literature is that policies do not a¤ect are not a¤ected by these di¤erences:
Case III occurs when Y 1 ¡ Y 0 di¤ers among people and people act on these di¤erences. In cases I and II, the marginal entrant into a program is the same as the average entrant. In case III, this is not so. People select in part on gains. If they select solely on gains, then the marginal entrant gets a lower return than those participants (in 1) who are inframarginal;
that is, the marginal treatment e¤ect (MTE)
See Heckman 2001a for more discussion of the various treatment e¤ects. 2 
Comparing Two Policy States
Consider two policies, A and B, that a¤ect sectoral choices without a¤ecting the distributions of potential outcomes. For concreteness, we can think of these as policies that a¤ect C (e.g., tuition or access) by shifting its mean, changing its variance or changing the covariance between C and (Y 0 ; Y 1 ). Each policy produces a distribution of outcomes. For concreteness, think of the outcome as wages associated with di¤erent schooling levels.
In the literature on evaluating inequality, comparisons of policies are made in terms of comparisons of distributions. If policy B produces an aggregate distribution of wages that stochastically dominates that produced from policy A, B is preferred. to accurately forecast the e¤ect of policy B on the overall distribution without previously observing it, as we demonstrate in this paper.
Our approach to the evaluation of public policy is more ambitious in some respects than the recent literature in welfare economics and is more in line with the objectives of modern political economy. (Persson and Tabellini, 2000) . We relax the anonymity postulate and determine how individuals at di¤erent positions within the initial overall distribution respond to policies in terms of their treatment choices and gains. We estimate the number of people directly a¤ected by the policy, where they start, and where they end up in the overall distribution.
In the context of the treatment e¤ect framework, this task is broken down into two sub-tasks. The …rst sub-task is to determine who shifts treatment state in response to the policy and where they are located in the initial overall distribution. The second sub-task is to determine where they end up in the overall distribution after taking the treatment, and how much they gain. Since this approach assumes that potential outcome distributions are not a¤ected by the policies, it is less ambitious, in this respect, than the approach advocated in modern welfare economics which entertains that possibility.
Under case I, this task is greatly simpli…ed. Everyone who shifts from "0" to \1" gets 
Case III di¤ers from case II in that in general the gains to the average switcher are 
Identifying Counterfactual Distributions Under Treatment E¤ect Assumptions
Identifying the joint distribution of potential outcomes under treatment e¤ect assumptions is more di¢cult than identifying the various mean treatment e¤ects. 4 The fundamental problem is that we never observe both components of (Y 0 ,Y 1 ) for anyone. 5 Thus we cannot directly form the joint distribution of potential outcomes (Y 0 ; Y 1 ).
In the Appendix, we review various approaches to estimating, or bounding, counterfactual distributions that have appeared in the literature. In our source paper, we develop a new method for identifying these distributions. It is based on an idea common in factor 4 A large econometric literature identi…es the mean impacts under a variety of assumptions. See Heckman, LaLonde and Smith (1999) for one survey. Vytlacil (2000, 2001 ) consider identi…cation of marginal treatment e¤ects and unify the treatment e¤ect literature. 5 Panel data estimators sometimes enable analysts to observe both components. See Heckman, LaLonde and Smith (1999).
analysis but applied to model counterfactual distributions. If potential outcomes are generated by a low dimensional set of factors, then it is possible to estimate the distributions of factors and generate distributions of the counterfactuals. Here, low dimensional refers to the number of factors relative to the number of measured outcomes. See the Appendix for the intuitive idea that motivates the analysis in our source paper. We next turn to an application of our analysis to American data.
Some Evidence From America on Two Educational Reforms
Our companion paper uses data on wages, schooling choices and covariates for white males from the National Longitudinal Study of Youth (NLSY) to estimate a three factor version of the model described in the Appendix using a Bayesian semiparametric mixture of normals econometric framework. We consider four schooling levels: dropout, high school graduate, junior college and four year college. We use local labor market variables, tuition and family background information to identify the model. The estimated model …ts the data well. Observed wage distributions are closely approximated. There is no need for more than three factors to …t our data which includes panel data measurements on wages as well as indicators of ability and motivation. 6 Our paper estimates models for a variety of schooling groups. Here, for the sake of brevity, we focus only on certain key empirical results. We report the wages returns to college and high school, and selection on levels and gains into those schooling categories.
We analyze two policies: (a) a full tuition subsidy for junior colleges and (b) a policy promoting access to four year colleges which places an institution in the immediate vicinity (the county of residence) of each American. We consider only partial equilibrium treatment e¤ects and do not consider the full cost of …nancing the reforms.
Our evidence shows considerable dispersion in terms of levels and returns (gains) to various schooling categories. Indeed, ex post returns are negative for a substantial fraction of people. There is little evidence of selection either on levels or gains for high school graduates. There is a lot of evidence of selection on levels and gains for college graduates.
The marginal entrants into four year colleges induced by the access policy we consider have wage outcomes below the average college participant both in terms of levels and gains. This is not true for the junior college tuition subsidy policy we also analyze. For that case, there is little impact on overall quality of junior college graduates. Using the estimated model, we compare two policies: a full subsidy to community college tuition and a policy that places a four year college in each county in America. Table 1 shows the average log wages of participants before the policy change and their average return. It compares these levels and returns with what the marginal participant attracted into the indicated schooling by the policy would earn. Marginal and average log wages and returns are about the same for the community college policy. There is little decline in quality among the entrants. For the access policy, there is a sharp di¤erence.
Average participants in four year colleges earn more and have higher returns than marginal entrants. There is a sharp decline in the average quality of college graduates.
Despite the substantial sizes of the policy changes we consider, the induced e¤ects on participation are small. The four year access policy only raises four year graduation rates by 1.3 percent. The junior college subsidy raises attendance at those institutions by 3.8 percent.
The policies operate unevenly over the deciles of the initial outcome distribution. Mobility is greatest at the center of the distribution for the community college policy. See Table 2 and Figure 6 . Mobility is from the top of the initial wage distribution for the four year college policy. See Table 3 and Figure 7 . Neither policy bene…ts the poor.
Our approach to the evaluation of social policy is much richer, and more informative, than an analysis of aggregate outcomes of the sort contemplated in modern welfare theory.
The overall Gini coe¢cient does not change (to two decimal points) when we implement the two policies. By the standards of that literature, the pre-and post-policy distributions are the same. A focus on the aggregate outcome distribution masks important details which our approach reveals. Only a small group of persons are directly a¤ected by the policy.
The vast majority of persons would be una¤ected by these policies, and presumably, would be indi¤erent to the policy. 7 Our approach to policy evaluation lifts the Veil of Ignorance and provides a more complete interpretation of who bene…ts from the policy and where bene…ciaries come from in the overall distribution of outcomes.
Summary and Conclusions
This paper summarizes our recent research on evaluating the distributional consequences of social programs. We move beyond the mean treatment e¤ects that dominate discussion in the recent applied evaluation literature to analyze the impacts of policy on distributions of outcomes. We develop and apply methods for determining which persons are a¤ected by the policy, where they come from in the initial distribution, and what their gains are.
We contrast the outcomes of participants in schooling before the policy change with the outcomes of marginal entrants induced into the treatment state by the policy. We compare 7 Counting their tax burden, they might even be hostile to these policies. Our analysis has been conducted for a partial equilibrium treatment e¤ect model that assumes that policies do not a¤ect the distribution of potential outcomes, just the choice probabilities of particular treatments. It would be desirable to extend our framework to analyze the e¤ects of more general policies that a¤ect both outcome distributions and choices using the general equilibrium framework described in Heckman (2001b). We leave that task for another occasion. 14 elementary case, leaving a complete discussion of the more general case for our companion paper.
Suppose that the mean of C depends on shifter variables Z that do not a¤ect (are independent of) potential outcomes (Y 0 ; Y 1 ). These are instruments. Suppose that for some values of Z within available samples we observe
while for other values of Z
Thus if Z is tuition, people who face a low tuition cost (possibly even a large subsidy) are almost surely likely to go to college while those who face a very high tuition cost are almost certainly likely not to go to school. 8 We assume that the distribution of potential outcomes is the same in these subsets as they are in the overall distribution. Thus we can identify the marginal distribution of Y 1 from the …rst sample and the marginal distribution of Y 0 from the second sample.
Within these samples, we observe post schooling outcomes Y 0t ; t = 1; : : : ; T; for Z 2 Z 0 ; Y 1t ; t = 1; : : : ; T; for Z 2 Z 1 :
From these data we can form the joint densities of each outcome over time on f(y 01 ; :::; y 0T ) and f (y 11 ; :::; y 1T ); but not the joint densities over time over both outcomes.
Now suppose that Y 0t and Y 1t are both generated by a common factor f (e.g., ability, motivation) so that Y 0t = ¹ 0t + ® 0t f + " 0t ; t = 1; : : : ; T ;
where the " 0t and " 1t are mutually independent of each other, f, and all other " 0t 0 ; " 0t 00 ; t 6 = t 0 ; t 00 .
9
All of these error components are assumed to have mean zero. A common factor generates both potential outcomes. If we can get our hands on the distribution of the common factor, we can compute the joint distribution of counterfactuals.
Within each regime we can compute the following covariances: For concreteness suppose T = 3, so we have three panel wage observations. Then
and 9 The means may depend on the covariates.
If we assume ® 01 = 1 or ¾ 2 f = 1; we can identify all of the rest of the factor loadings. 10 With this information in hand, we can identify the variances of the uniquenesses, " 0t ; " 1t of the outcomes: and we can identify ® 03 up to sign and hence can identify ® 02 and ® 01 . If we normalize ® 01 = 1, we can identify, ® 02 ; ® 03 up to sign and ¾ 2 f . Since the sign of f is unknown, the sign of the factor loadings is unknown. Using the data on Y 1 ; under either normalization, we can identify ® 1 1 ;® 12 ; ® 13 since ¾ 2 f is known. joint distribution of schooling choices across potential outcomes.
In our companion paper we show that we can obtain this joint density without a normality assumption for f or " 0t ; " 1t ; t = 1; :::; T . We extend our analysis to allow for vector f so there may be many factors, not just one. We show that it is possible to nonparametrically identify the joint density of potential outcomes provided that the number of panel data wage measurements is large, in a sense we make precise in our companion paper, relative to the number of factors. 
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